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Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1 (Jan. 17, 2008)
Civil Procedure – Motion for New Trial for Attorney Misconduct
Summary
This is an en banc rehearing of Lioce v. Cohen. 1 This case involves the consolidated
appeals of four district court orders, two granting new trials because of attorney misconduct and
two denying new trials because of attorney misconduct.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering two
new trials because on attorney misconduct. The Court also vacated the District Court’s denials
of motions for new trial because of attorney misconduct and remanded the cases for new
decisions consistent with the standards in the opinion.
The Court previously remanded two cases to calculate monetary sanctions for the
attorney guilty of misconduct, but on rehearing declined to impose monetary sanctions instead
referring the attorney to the Nevada State Bar.
Factual and Procedural History
The four consolidated appeals in this case are grouped together because all four
defendants shared the same defense attorney, Phillip Emerson. The four cases were all personal
injury proceedings and Mr. Emerson gave a similar closing argument in each case. The motions
for a new trial because of attorney misconduct are based on the statements made in these closing
arguments.
Mr. Emerson’s closing arguments all contained similar arguments and statements
reflecting his personal views on the cases and how the jury should decide the matters. In each
proceeding, Mr. Emerson called the lawsuits frivolous and wastes of the taxpayers money. He
further stated that lawsuits of this vein gave the legal profession and the American justice system
a bad reputation. Mr. Emerson also gave his personal reasons for participating in cases such as
these which included his personal mission to improve the public’s view of the legal profession
and to fight those who bring frivolous personal injury lawsuits.
The substance of the closing arguments was basically the same but the plaintiffs’ counsel
in each proceeding reacted differently.
In Castro v. Cabrera, the Cabreras’ attorney did not object to Mr. Emerson’s closing
argument. The jury found in Castro’s favor and the Cabreras moved for a new trial on the basis
that Mr. Emerson’s closing argument amounted to attorney misconduct. The District Court
found that Mr. Emerson’s closing argument constituted attorney misconduct and further found
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that it permeated the entire proceeding which called for a new trial. Castro appealed the
decision.
In Lioce v. Cohen, Lioce’s attorney did not object to Mr. Emerson’s closing argument.
After a verdict in favor of the defendant, Lioce moved for a directed verdict or a new trial
because of attorney misconduct. The District Court denied both motions without stating its
reasons or reporting the hearing on the motions.
In Lang v. Knippenberg, Mr. Emerson made the same closing argument, but the Langs
objected multiple times throughout the discourse. The District Court sustained each objection
but did not admonish Mr. Emerson for his conduct. After the closing argument, the Langs
moved for a mistrial based on Mr. Emerson’s closing argument which was denied because the
objections to the closing argument had been sustained. After a jury verdict in favor of the
defendant, the Langs moved for a new trial because of attorney misconduct but the District Court
denied the motion. The District Court’s reason for denial was that the attorney misconduct did
not permeate the entire trial to an extent that a new trial would be warranted.
In Seasholtz v. Wheeler, Seasholtz stipulated liability for an auto accident and even so,
Mr. Emerson gave the same closing argument. Wheeler’s attorney did not object to Mr.
Emerson’s closing argument. After the jury found in favor of the defendant, Wheeler moved for
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial because of attorney misconduct. The
District Court granted a new trial despite the lack of objection because it found that Mr.
Emerson’s closing argument amounted to attorney misconduct which was of such sinister
influence that it constituted irreparable error.
The Nevada Supreme Court consolidated the four appeals that resulted from the
foregoing cases and heard them in Lioce v. Cohen. 2 The Court revised the standards under
which District Courts are to evaluate motions for new trials because of attorney misconduct. It
then reversed the denials of new trials in Lioce and Cohen and remanded the cases to the District
Court for further consideration consistent with the Court’s opinion. The Court also affirmed the
grants of new trials in Castro and Seasholtz and made the determination that Mr. Emerson’s
conduct in those cases amounted to attorney misconduct and should be evaluated for monetary
sanctions. The Court also referred Mr. Emerson to the Nevada State Bar for disciplinary
proceeding.
Discussion
A.

Prior Attorney Misconduct Jurisprudence

The Nevada Supreme Court first evaluated attorney misconduct in Barrett v. Baird. 3 The
Court stated that “[t]o warrant a new trial on grounds of attorney misconduct, the flavor of
misconduct must sufficiently permeate an entire proceeding to provide conviction that the jury
was influenced by passion and prejudice in reaching its verdict.” 4 Because the Nevada
2
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Supreme Court never addressed the issue of objections to attorney misconduct, the Barrett rule
implicitly applied to both objected-to and unobjected-to misconduct.
The next Nevada Supreme Court case addressing attorney misconduct is DeJesus v.
Flick. 5 The issue on appeal was whether a party’s failure to object to improper argument during
trial foreclosed that party from raising the issue in the context of an appeal from an order
denying a new trial with Barrett being the standard for the attorney’s unobjected-to misconduct. 6
The majority recognized the general rule that states a failure to object to attorney misconduct
precludes review. 7 However, it also held that an exception to the general rule should apply to
prevent plain error that results from the “inflammatory quality and sheer quantity of misconduct”
by the opposing party’s attorney. 8 The DeJesus majority holding created a rule that unobjected
to misconduct would only be reviewed to see if the exception applies.
The DeJesus dissent argued for a different standard than that used by the majority. This
proposed rule would be that claims of attorney misconduct are generally entitled to no
consideration unless a timely and proper objection and a request for admonishment has been
made. 9 This rule would prevent unnecessary appellate review by allowing the trial court to make
a ruling on the matter, but the dissent did recognize that the majority rule may be necessary in
some extreme cases. 10
The Nevada Supreme Court once again evaluated its standards on unobjected-to
misconduct in Ringle v. Bruton. 11 The Court stated that counsel must timely and specifically
object to instances of improper argument in order to preserve the issue for appeal.12 The Court
held that it would only consider “egregious but unobjected-to misconduct…only in those rare
circumstances where the comments are of such sinister influence as to constitute irreparable and
fundamental error.” 13 This plain error rule means that the “irreparable and fundamental error”
must be such that, if left uncorrected, “would result in a substantial miscarriage of justice or
denial of fundamental rights.” 14
The Court concluded its historical analysis by stating that the Ringle Court’s reliance on
DeJesus for its plain error rule was improper and that this rule was misapplied in that case. The
Court further announced that the Barrett permeation rule is incomplete and the DeJesus
“inflammatory quality and sheer quantity” test is unworkable. It also limits the Ringle plain error
test to situations where there is no other reasonable explanation for the verdict except for
misconduct.
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B.

New Standards for Evaluating Attorney Misconduct

The Court followed its historical analysis of attorney misconduct standards by clarifying
what the standards will be from this case forth. It began by stating that the Barrett rule for
objected-to misconduct dopes not sufficiently consider and apply the salutary purposes of
objection and for that reason is explicitly overruled. The language in Barrett that states a new
trial is proper when attorney misconduct sufficiently permeates the proceedings remains good
law.
1.

Objected-to and Admonished Attorney Misconduct

The Court decided that the standard articulated in DeJesus’ dissenting opinion is the
correct rule for evaluating objected-to and admonished misconduct. In the case of objected-to
and admonished misconduct, a party moving for a new trial bears the burden of showing that the
misconduct is so extreme that the objection and admonishment could not remove the
misconduct’s effect. When the district court finds that is the case then a new trial is warranted.
2.

Objected-to but not admonished Attorney Misconduct

In the case where the district court overrules an objection to purported attorney
misconduct and does not admonish the jury, the party moving for a new trial must first
demonstrate that the district court erred in overruling the party’s objection. If the district court
concludes that the objection to attorney misconduct should have been sustained, then the district
court must determine whether an admonition to the jury would likely have affected the verdict in
favor of the moving party. The Court must evaluate both the evidence and the parties’ and
attorneys’ demeanor to determine whether a party’s substantial rights were affected by the
court’s failure to sustain the objection and admonish the jury. If this is so then a new trial
because of attorney misconduct is warranted.
3.

Repeated or Continued Objected-to but not admonished Attorney Misconduct

The Court noted that when an attorney must continuously object to repeated or persistent
misconduct, the non-offending attorney is placed in a dilemma of having to make repeated
objections before the trier of fact, which may cast a negative impression on the attorney and
represented party, which in turn emphasizes the incorrect point. The Court’s standard for these
situations is that when the district court decides a motion for a new trial based on repeated
objected-to misconduct, the district court shall factor into the analysis that the attorney has
accepted the risk that the jury will be influenced by his misconduct by engaging in persistent
attorney misconduct. The Court demands that great weight be given to the fact that single
instances of improper attorney conduct that could have been cured by objection and
admonishment may be incurable when that conduct is repeated.

4.

Unobjected-to Attorney Misconduct

The Court restates the rule in Ringle that a party must object to purportedly improper
argument to preserve the issue for appeal. 15 However, in cases of plain error, the courts may still
review allegations of unobjected-to attorney misconduct. As stated in Ringle, the party who
moves for a new trial based on unobjected-to attorney misconduct must show that no other
reasonable explanation for the verdict exists. The standard remains the district court must find
“irreparable and fundamental error” that, if left uncorrected, “would result in a substantial
miscarriage of justice or denial of fundamental rights.”
5.

Mr. Emerson’s Alleged Attorney Misconduct

The Court found that each of Mr. Emerson’s closing arguments constituted attorney
misconduct. The arguments fell into three categories of misconduct: (1) jury nullification; (2)
statements of personal opinion; and (3) golden rule arguments. Each of these types of argument
utilized by Mr. Emerson was improper.
6.

Disposition of the Appeals

The final task for the court was to determine whether the district court erred in its
decisions on the motions for new trials.
In the Castro case, the Court upheld the grant of a new trial based on attorney misconduct
even though the Cabreras’ attorney did not object to the misconduct and district court applied the
Barrett “sufficiently permeated the proceedings” standard. The district court found that Mr.
Emerson’s arguments constituted repeated attorney misconduct egregious enough to warrant a
new trial and the Court upheld its order for a new trial.
In Seasholtz, the district court found that Mr. Emerson’s argument amounted to
irreparable and fundamental error and granted the motion for a new trial. The Court upheld the
district court’s order even though it used the improper standard.
In Lang, the Court found that the district court improperly applied the Barrett and
DeJesus standards when deciding the Langs’ motion for a new trial based on attorney
misconduct. The Court vacated the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial and
remanded it to the district court to apply the correct standards.
In Lioce, the district court did not provide any reasoning for it denial of the motion for a
new trial based on attorney misconduct. The Court concluded that it could not evaluate the
district court’s decision so it vacated the order and remanded the matter for further consideration
consistent with the new standards.
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7.

Sanctions for Mr. Emerson

In the Court’s opinion prior to rehearing, it imposed sanctions on Mr. Emerson for his
conduct in the Castro and Seasholt cases. The Court now declines to impose sanctions on Mr.
Emerson as such decisions are best left to the discretion of the district court. The Court referred
Mr. Emerson to the Nevada State Bar for an investigation of potential violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Dissenting/Concurring Opinions
Justice Parraguirre wrote an opinion concurring in part with the majority’s analysis of the
standards for attorney misconduct and the refusal to impose monetary sanctions on Mr. Emerson
and dissenting in part with the decision to refer Mr. Emerson to the Nevada State Bar. Justice
Parraguirre would decline to refer Mr. Emerson to the Nevada State Bar without a finding of
appellate abuse. Justice Maupin joins in Justice Parraguirre’s opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
Conclusion
In the four consolidated appeals heard in Lioce v. Cohen, the Court revised its standards
for attorney misconduct jurisprudence. The Court further required that district court’s make
specific finding on the record and in their orders regarding these standards. The orders granting
new trials based on attorney misconduct in Castro and Seasholtz are affirmed. The orders
denying motions for new trials in Lang and Lioce are vacated and remanded to the district courts
for decisions consistent with the standards set forth in this opinion.

